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Abstract—The success of future intelligent power deliver and
transmission systems across the globe relies critically on the
availability of a fast, scalable, and most importantly secure
communication infrastructure between the energy producers and
consumers. One major obstacle to ensure secure communication
among various parties in a smart grid network hinges on the
technical and implementation difficulties associated with key
distribution in such large-scale network with often-time disin-
terested consumers. This paper proposes the use of an identity-
based signcryption (IBS) system to provide a zero-configuration
encryption and authentication solution for end-to-end secure
communications. The suitability of employing such identity-based
cryptosystems in the context of smart grids is studied from the
perspective of security requirements, implementation overhead
and ease of management. Using the design and implementation
experience of our proposed system as an example, we illustrate
that IBS is a viable solution to providing a secure and easy-to-
deploy solution with close to zero user setup required.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future power deliver and transmission systems across the
globe are poised to evolve into highly sophisticated smart
grids that rely heavily on information technologies for control
and feedback. One key component of these smart grids will
be to utilize advanced metering infrastructures (AMIs) that
comprise of smart-meters and monitoring sensors installed
at customer homes. Smart-appliances, such as an intelligent
washer-machine, will then be able to engage in demand
response control through real-time communication with the
attached smart-meter. Furthermore, distributed monitoring sen-
sors will be responsible of reporting back energy usage and
other user demand to various energy producers through layers
of data collectors, home gateways and substations. Fig. 1
depicts a conceptual organization of such AMI.
In order to facilitate two-way communications between the
consumers and the producers, it is perceivable that a wide
spectrum of physical networks will be employed in different
segments of the smart grid, ranging from custom-built dedi-
cated wireless radios and power line communication network
to commodity public switched telephone network (PSTN), or
even the Internet. The highly distributed and the inherently
insecure nature of the latter have made them particularly
vulnerable to wide-scale, remote, and distributed security at-
tacks. Therefore, security concerns such as consumer privacy,
device authentication, as well as data integrity must first be
addressed before any higher-level energy policies, such as
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Fig. 1. Conceptual organization of an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
that relies on a scalable and secure communication network.
intelligent pricing strategies, can be successfully implemented
and deployed.
Security issues concerning smart grids and AMIs have been
studied extensively by a number of security experts [1], [2],
[3]. Collectively, it is not difficult to see that given the sheer
size and complexity of AMIs, any truly secure system must
incorporate appropriate security measures in all levels of the
system. It includes the physical security of the smart-meters,
which are usually located in insecure facilities, as well as
the cyber security of the communication network among the
meters and the energy sensors and smart-appliances, among
other things.
The focus of this paper is on securing network communica-
tions in AMIs. In particular, we propose the use of an identity-
based signcryption system to address the security issues of
confidentiality and authenticity in an AMI communication
network. Compared to other public-key systems, our proposed
system provides scalable and secure communications among
smart-meters, smart-appliances and monitoring sensors with-
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out requiring complex setup from the users. As the proposed
signcryption scheme requires no per-device software setup
from the user, we term this scheme a zero-configuration sign-
cryption scheme. Because of its very simple key management
mechanism, our scheme is particularly suitable for use in smart
grids in which secure communications must be provided for
use among a large number of devices in the grid.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
background information about identity-based crypto systems
and its role in smart grids will first be presented. Details
about proposed signcryption scheme will be shown in Sec-
tion III, followed by results of our initial implementation in
Section IV. We discuss security and application considerations
in Section V and will conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SMART GRID
A. Identity-Based Cryptography
The concept of identity-based Cryptography (IBC) was
first introduced by Shamir in 1984 [4]. In 2001, Boneh and
Franklin [5] invented the first feasible solutions for IBC using
the Weil pairing on elliptic curves. Since then, many ID-based
key agreement protocols and signature schemes using bilinear
pairing have been suggested [6].
IBC is a public key cryptosystem in which each user has two
keys. When one key is used to encrypt a message, decryption
is performed using the other key. In a public key system, one
key is published, namely, a public key, while the other one
is kept as a secret, namely, a private key. When Alice wants
to send a private message to Bob, she encrypts the message
using Bob’s public key. Bob then applies his private key to
decrypt the encrypted message from Alice.
The main differentiating characteristic of an IBC system
is that any agreed upon on and publicly available unique
information about a user, such as her email address, can be
used to generate the user’s public key. As a result, Alice
may send encrypted messages to Bob without any prior
communication with Bob or any trusted third-party such as
a certificate authority (CA). It is the responsibility of the
receiver, Bob, to establish authenticated communication with
a key-generating server (KGS) to obtain his private key, only
if he wishes to decrypt the encrypted messages. Furthermore,
Bob may keep his private key for as long as the key is valid
without any further communication with the KGS. This feature
greatly simplifies the cryptosystem setup and reduces key-
exchange data traffic. Furthermore, as we will argue later, this
asymmetry in key management is very useful with smart grid
systems where a large variety of components with different
computing and power requirements are presence.
In contrast, in X.509, and in many other traditional pub-
lic key systems, a trustworthy certificate authority (CA) is
responsible for providing legitimate key information for all
communication. It is required because although public keys
are not sensitive information, it is necessary to ensure that
Alice acquires the real public key of Bob, instead of fake ones
provided by Trudy. As a result, before sending any message to
Bob, Alice needs to obtain a certificate from CA that contains
Bob’s key.
In other words, in X.509, it is the sender’s responsibility
to talk to the KGS, while in IBC, it is the recipient’s duty
to obtain the necessary key from the KGS. In the following,
we would like to demonstrate the advantages of using IBC in
smart grid applications. Details of our proposed IBC scheme
will be provided in Section III.
B. Utilizing IBC in Smart-Grids
We first study the communication pattern of a smart grid. It
is expected that large amount of sensors and measurement de-
vices are used to continuously monitor the energy generation,
transmission, and usage. Some data are collected every second
or more frequently than other. Sensors would send their data
to a nearby sink node. For instance, the smart meter installed
in a household would be responsible for collecting the data
of all the sensors residing in that home. It can be observed
that traffic mainly goes from the sensors to the sink node in
such scenario. Moreover, sensors and measurement devices are
likely to be battery-powered and subject to energy constraint.
On the other hand, the sink node, such as the smart meter, does
not have energy concern and may connect to the KGS through
the Internet directly. Therefore, in smart grid, we should off-
load the senders of messages as much as possible. As IBC
relieves the senders from talking to the KGS, it is a very
promising security solution for smart grids.
IBC also allows re-keying, also called key revocation, to be
initiated by the sender, which is different from conventional
public-key infrastructure (PKI). When Alice wants Bob to use
a different pair of public key and private key, she simply
encrypts the packet using a new public key of her choice,
such as, a key generated by using Bob’s ID appended with
a timestamp. When Bob receives packets that are encrypted
using a new public key, he must obtain the corresponding
new private key from the KGS for decryption. This feature
allows the measurement devices to issue re-keying based on
their individual needs. For example, different devices may take
measurements at different frequencies with different levels of
on-board buffering. Moreover, to enhance security, the same
key should not be used for too many packets. When IBC is
used, individual device can determine when to change the key
according to its own data and security requirement. Traditional
PKI does not offer this flexibility.
III. PROPOSED SIGNCRYPTION SYSTEM
As a proof of concept on the use of IBC in smart grid
systems, we have developed a signcryption scheme that is
based on the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE)
scheme [5] for data encryption and the identity-based signature
(IBS) scheme proposed in [7] for authenticating data packets
transmitted among devices. As our scheme provides both
encryption and signature-based authentication, it is termed as a
signcryption scheme. In our scheme, we assume each device in
the system, such as a smart-meter, has its own unique machine
identity number (ID). For instance, the manufacturing serial
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number of a smart-meter can be used as its unique machine
ID. This ID is in turn used as the identity of the device for
all subsequent cryptographic functions.
In our scheme, for encryption purposes, Tate pairing [8]
on an elliptic curve E is used to generate the shared secret
between the message sender and receiver. Such shared secret
is used as the per-packet key for encrypting the data packet.
For authentication purposes, the same Tate pairing is used to
sign and verify the data packet. Tate pairing was chosen in our
scheme because of its relatively low computational cost when
compared to other pairing maps. For example, an effective
algorithm for calculating Tate pairing was proposed by Miller
and was further improved by the works of [9] and [10]. In [11]
and [12], a fast formula for the Tate paring computation of
supersingular elliptic curve over binary field was proposed. In
IBE, it makes use of the bilinearity property of Tate pairing
in the calculation of a common secret for packet encryption.
A. Overview
There are two distinct phases in our signcryption scheme.
First, a device must register with a central key-generating
server (KGS) to obtain its private key if it wants to decrypt
message received or sign message to be transmitted during its
operation. The KGS holds the master key of the system that
is required for generating the private key of a device. Once
equipped with its private key, a device may then communicate
with any other devices in the smart grid without contacting
the KGS again. In this sense, the workload of our KGS is
much lower than a certificate authority (CA) of a conventional
public-key infrastructure (PKI).
Subsequently, when a device A wants to transmit data to
device B, A would encrypt each individual packet with a
unique key generated based on B’s public key and sign each
packet using its own private key. Upon receiving an encrypted
packet, B decrypts the encrypted packet using its own private
key and verifies the content of the decrypted packet using A’s
public key. As a proof-of-concept, AES was chosen in our
scheme for the encryption of the content of data packets.
B. System Setup
One characteristic of the use of Tate pairing is that the
choice of the underlying elliptic curve E affects not only
the efficiency of all subsequent computations, but also the
security level of our scheme. The communication overhead for
encryption and signature is directly proportional to the degree
of E. At the same time, the security level of the signcryption
scheme increases with the degree of E. Therefore, a trade-off
must be made to balance the effects.
In our current implementation, we chose the underlying
elliptic curve as a supersingular curve E over F (2m) with
different m to achieve different security levels. Under different
choices of m, the security level of the proposed scheme is
comparable to an RSA encryption scheme with equivalent key
length as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
SECURITY LEVEL OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME COMPARED TO RSA AS A
FUNCTION OF m.
m 113 163 233 283
RSA key length (bit) 512 1024 2240 3456
C. Master Key and Device Registration
For each instance of our IBE system, the KGS must first
generate a set of system-wide parameters according to the
following steps:
STEP i : Select a point P on E.
STEP ii : Generate a field x ∈ Z∗p randomly.
STEP iii : Calculate xP .
While x is kept by the KGS as the master key, P and xP
are announced to all users as the public parameters for the
system.
During the manufacture of a device (e.g. Alice), a pair of
device-registration keys, A DR and Sa DR, and the system
parameters, P and xP are embedded into the device. A DR
is generated by some unique manufacturing ID of Alice (e.g.
serial no. of smart meter or MAC address of server), whereas
Sa DR is calculated by KGS using the following equation:
Sa DR ← x ·A DR (1)
Before Alice can communicate with other devices in the
smart grid network, she must make registration to KGS
through the following procedures:
STEP i : Alice calculates her public key, A, using her device
ID.
STEP ii : Alice constructs a packet containing A DR, A
and other registration information, sign the whole
packet by Sa DR to form a digital signature, SIG
STEP iii : Alice sends the packet with SIG to KGS
STEP iv : KGS receives the packet with SIG, verifies SIG
using A DR
STEP v : KGS calculates the private key of Alice, Sa using
the following equation:
Sa ← x ·A (2)
STEP vi : KGS encrypts Sa by A DR to form Sa′
STEP vii : KGS signs Sa by its private key to form Sig(Sa)
STEP viii : KGS sends Sa′ and Sig(Sa) to Alice
STEP ix : Alice receives Sa′, verifies Sig(Sa) by KGS’s
public key and then decrypts Sa′ by Sa DR to
obtain Sa
After Alice obtains Sa, she can use it for subsequent com-
munications with other devices in the smart grid network. A
device-registration key pair is only used for device registration
for a single device and KGS will ignore duplicated use of any
key pair.
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D. Data Packet Transmission
When Alice sends data packets to Bob, the packets are
encrypted and signed using the following steps:
STEP i : Calculate the public key of Bob based on his
machine ID.
STEP ii : Pick k randomly from Z∗p .
STEP iii : Calculate kP .
STEP iv : Calculate the shared secret for this packet, s, using
the underlying predefined Tate pairing τ(·) where
s ← τ(B, xP )k. (3)
STEP v : Convert s to a key of length of 128, 192 or 256
bits depending on the value of m and use it as the
per-packet key, Ks.
STEP vi : Encrypt content of the data packet, M , to form M ′
by an AES block cipher using Ks as the encryption
key.
STEP vii : Calculate r where
r ← τ(P,P )k. (4)
STEP viii : Calculate v, the signature of M , using the equation
v ← h(M, r), (5)
where h(·) is an MD5 hash function.
STEP ix : Calculate U with
U ← vSA + kP. (6)
STEP x : Send X(kP ), M ′, X(U), and v to Bob where
X(kP ) and X(U) are the x-coordinate of kP and
U respectively.
E. Data Packet Reception
When Bob receives encrypted data packets with signature
from Alice, he takes the following steps to decrypt and verify
the packets:
STEP i : Calculate kP based on the received X(kP ).
STEP ii : Calculate s using his private key, i.e.
s ← τ(xB, kP ). (7)
STEP iii : Convert s to Ks.
STEP iv : Decrypt the received data packet, M ′ using Ks as
the decryption key.
STEP v : Calculate U based on the received X(U).
STEP vi : Calculate r using Alice’s public key, where
r = τ(U,P )τ(A,−x · P )v. (8)
STEP vii : Calculate v′ using Equation (5).
STEP viii : Accept the signature if and only if v′ is equal to
the received v.
TABLE II
PROCESSING TIME FOR A DATA PACKET.
m 113 163 233 283
Encryption (ms) 12 30 64 90
Signing (ms) 2 3 5 6
Decryption (ms) 10 27 49 83
Verification (ms) 22 56 101 170
TABLE III
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME.
m 113 163 233 283
X(kP ) (bit) 113 163 233 283
X(U) (bit) 113 163 233 283
v (bit) 113 128 128 128
Total overhead (byte) 42 57 75 87
IV. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
To demonstrate the feasibility of the above methodology,
we have implemented the proposed signcryption in software.
A. Implementation Details
The identity-based signcryption scheme was implemented
in a 1.6GHz Pentium IV computer under Microsoft Windows
environment using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 development
tool. An open source library called MIRACL was used for
implementing all the cryptographic algorithms.
We implemented the proposed scheme using elliptic curves
with different values of m and measured the time for process-
ing a data packet. The size of a data packet is 128 bytes. The
result is listed in Table II.
B. Communication Bandwidth Overhead
Referring to Section III-D, the communication overhead in
the data packet is X(kP ), X(U) and v which is proportional
to m as shown in Table III.
C. Speed Improvement
The most time-consuming step in the proposed signcryption
scheme is the calculation of Tate pairing. To improve the
throughput of the signcryption scheme, we propose a key
caching scheme to reduce the number of Tate pairing calcula-
tions for every data packet.
The proposed key caching scheme works as follows. After
Alice encrypts and signs the first data packet sent to Bob, she
caches kP , s and r. When she sends the next data packet to
Bob, she calculates kP , s and r using the following equations
instead of following steps ii-iv and vii in Section III-D:
kP ← kP + kP (9)
s ← s2 (10)
r ← r2. (11)
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TABLE IV
PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE PROPOSED SCHEME.
Attack Threat Protection provided
Attacker hijacks
data sent from smart
meters.
Loss of customer
privacy.
Meter data are encrypted
and no information
would be leaked to
unauthorized person.
Attacker modifies
control commands
sent to smart meters.
Smart meters cannot
work properly.
Control commands are
signed and smart meters
would ignore all forged
commands.
Customer repudiates
metered values sent
to power company.
Power company can-
not charge the cus-
tomer.
Meter data are signed
with source information
and time stamp, making
repudiation impossible.
Similarly, Bob caches kP and s after decrypting the first
data packet received from Alice. The cached values are sub-
sequently used to calculate the new kP and s for decrypting
the next data packet from Alice.
After sending N (a parameter predetermined by Alice) data
packets to Bob, Alice resets her key cache and follows step
ii- iv and vii in Section III-D again to calculate kP , s and r.
On the other hand, as the term, τ(A,−x·P ) in Equation (8)
depends only on the public key of Alice, Bob can also cache
it after verifying the first data packet received from Alice and
use it for subsequently verifying data packets sent from Alice.
With the proposed key caching scheme, the total number
of Tate pairing calculations for transmitting and receiving a
data packet can be reduced to zero and one respectively and
the corresponding processing time for encrypting, signing,
decrypting and verifying a data packet with m = 113 can
be reduced to 16μS, 0.6mS, 16μS and 12mS respectively.
Note that this proposed key caching scheme has intrinsic
capability for solving the synchronization problem. That is,
if Bob fails to receive any of the data packets from Alice,
the cached s cannot be used to calculate the new s for the
decryption of the next data packet from Alice. However, Bob
can still use the received X(kP ), X(U) and v and follows
all steps in Section III-E to decrypt and verify the next data
packet and resynchronize the key exchange between Alice and
him.
Another simple way for speed improvement is to use per-
session key instead of per-packet key in the encryption of
packets.
V. DISCUSSIONS
A. Security Consideration
The proposed signcryption scheme can provide end-to-end
encryption, source authentication and message integrity for
data sent between devices in a smart grid. Thus, it can protect
against not only passive attacks (eavesdropping and sniffing
data as it passes over the grid) but also active attacks (altering
data and masquerading as another individual to send data over
the grid). Example of attacks and the protections provided by
the proposed signcryption scheme is shown in Table IV.
Other security considerations are:
1) Chosen-Plaintext Attack: As any user in the system can
use the signcryptor to encrypt any chosen plaintext, the system
is subject to chosen-plaintext attack in which an attacker
can choose the plaintext that gets encrypted and obtain the
corresponding ciphertext from the output of the encryptor.
However, as an AES cipher is used for the encryption, it
is unlikely to discover the key for the encryption by simply
analyzing the plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In addition, each data
packet is encrypted by a unique per-packet key. Therefore, the
security of the system will not be seriously affected even if
one of the keys is discovered by the attacker.
2) Key Escrow: As the KGS is in possession of the master
secret, x, it encompasses the full knowledge of private keys
of all devices, allowing it to decrypt any message sent to any
device or impersonate any device to sign any message sent
to others. There are two ways to reduce the risk of breaking
the entire IBC system owing to the compromise of the KGS;
first, by using distributed key generating servers, and second,
by using short-lived master key.
In the first method, x is split into two or more parts. Each
part, xi, is then kept independently by a different key gen-
erating server, KGSi. When a device, such as Alice registers
with the system, she must approach each KGS independently.
Each KGS will then return a partial private key as well as
xiP to her after verifying her identity. Once equipped with
such information, Alice may then calculate her true private
key, xA as well as xP . Since each KGSi possesses only xi,
no individual KGS can calculate the private key of any device
unless all KGS conspire to do so, which also reduces the risk
of compromising x if any one KGS is compromised.
The second method to lower the chance of compromising
the master secret key, x is by employing a short-lived master
key. In this case, KGS changes the value of x at a regular
interval. With each new master key, private keys for all devices
are also updated. The details of the key update scheme is
presented in Section V-A4.
3) Key revocation: KGS maintains a key revocation table
containing IDs of all devices whose keys have been revoked.
Whenever the private key of an individual device (Bob) is lost
or compromised, Bob can no longer use his private key which
was generated by KGS based on his ID. Thus, Bob needs to
report the case to KGS, change his device ID and register to
KGS. Upon the request from Bob, KGS issues to Bob a new
private key based on his new ID, adds the old ID of Bob into
the key revocation table and broadcasts the table to all devices
to notify them the update of the table.
During normal communication between devices, when a
device (Alice) needs to communicate with another device
(Bob), Alice first checks whether the ID of Bob appears in
the key revocation table. If Bob’s ID is found, Alice realizes
that Bob’s key has been revoked and so she will cease the
communication with Bob.
4) Key Update: To further enhance the security of the
system, the master key of the system, x should be updated
regularly. To achieve this, the following key update scheme is
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TABLE V
KEY UPDATE PROCESSING TIME.
m 113 163 233 283
Parameter generation time 0.55ms 0.85ms 1.5ms 2.3ms
Private key generation time 0.55ms 0.85ms 1.5ms 2.3ms
proposed. Each master key, x, can only be used for certain
period of time. Upon expiry of x, KGS generates a new key,
x′, and then calculates a new x′P and the private keys of all
devices in the system. Finally, KGS encrypts the new private
key of each device by the device’s old public key and then
sends the encrypted new private key to each device. Upon
receiving the encrypted private key, each device decrypts the
received key using its old private key and then obtains the new
private key.
Table V tabulates the time requirement for calculating the
new x′P and the private keys of each device.
After generating the private keys of all smart meters, KGS
needs to distribute the private key to each smart meter. As the
total number of smart meters in a smart grid may be huge,
it is not possible to distribute the keys to all smart meters
simultaneously. It is proposed to have a grace period in which
both the expired key and the new key can coexist. During the
grace period, if Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she
first asks Bob if he has already updated his key. If not, Alice
will only use the old keys in the communication with Bob.
B. Application of the proposed scheme
Using different m, the proposed scheme can be used
in different applications for smart grid. For example, in a
transmission grid, many sensors deployed in overhead trans-
mission lines may sample signals at 50Hz. If the proposed
signcryption scheme with m = 113 and the key caching
scheme as described in Section IV-C is used, the time for
processing one data package to be sent from a sensor is only
about 12ms and so the signcryption scheme is fast enough
to handle the traffic in the transmission grid. On the other
hand, in distribution grid, smart meters report energy usage at
much lower frequency. However, information such as billing
information to be transmitted in the grid is so important that
tampering with such information may lead to a great money
loss to the power company. In such case, we can choose a
greater value of m with a view to increasing the security level
of the signcryption algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a zero-configuration identity-based signcryp-
tion scheme is presented to illustrate security capabilities
enabled by identity-based cryptosystems that are suitable for
smart grid systems. The machine identity number (ID) of a
device connected in a smart grid is used to generate unique
keys to encrypt and sign each individual data packet sent
among devices in the grid. IBC allows low power devices
such as sensor nodes to transmit encrypted data to data
collectors without ever contacting the key server, thereby
greatly simplifying system setup without compromising se-
curity. Furthermore, since all information required to generate
encryption keys is available with the sender, no communication
with centralized key servers is needed during normal data
transmission phases. Finally, since a new per-packet key is
generated for each individual data packet, the risk of key
hijacking is virtually eliminated.
The proposed signcryption scheme has been implemented
in software and the initial implementation results indicate
that it can work effectively to provide strong encryption and
authentication for data packets sent among devices in a smart
grid. Furthermore, using a key-caching scheme, high data
throughput can be achieved. Because of the scalability of
the signcryption scheme, it can be used flexibly to provide
different security levels at different implementation costs that
can fit different applications in smart grids.
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